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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether or not one works in the field of energy law, or pays much or absolutely no 
attention to what goes on in energy markets, the reality of ever-increasing and heretofore 
unknown demands for power to drive the wheels of modern society appears a fact far too 
obvious to deny.1 Those demands have sent entrepreneurs world-wide on a search for de-
posits of long-familiar carbon fuel sources, and for the identification of prime locations 
                                                        
 * Phyllis Hurley Frey Professor of Law (2010-2013), and Sustainable Energy Resources Law Program 
Fellow, University of Tulsa; J.S.D. (1987) and W.B. Cutting Fellow (1980-81), Columbia University Law 
School.  
 1. On the growing demand for energy, see generally ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, U.S. DEPT. OF 
1
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for the production of power from alternative energy resources such as wind and solar.2 
Against that backdrop, the forms of legal arrangement that can be struck between an 
energy entrepreneur and an owner of land in which such an entrepreneur might express 
interest would seem limited only by one’s imagination. Obviously, the most familiar ar-
rangement is that of a royalty payment made by the energy entrepreneur to the owner of 
land used by the entrepreneur for some energy-related activity, with the activity itself oc-
curring on the basis of the entrepreneur being granted a right to engage in such activity, 
while title to the land itself is retained by the original owner.3 
This essay focuses on another entirely distinct form of arrangement. That arrange-
ment essentially involves an actual enforceable sale to the energy entrepreneur of land of 
interest, with the sale occurring in the context of a wholly separate written commitment 
through which the seller purports to obligate the purchaser—and any heirs, successors, 
assigns, or transferees of the purchaser—to make periodic and regular money payments to 
a seller-established entity created to receive such payments for the benefit and favor of the 
seller or its heirs, when and if prescribed energy-related activity is undertaken on the con-
veyed land. Such an arrangement might be struck because of seller-perceived tax ad-
vantages, a desire for a long-term income stream benefiting the seller or its heirs, or the 
simple fact of wanting to structure the sale and purchase of the land itself in a way that 
affords an interested energy entrepreneur otherwise priced-out with an opportunity not 
available using more standard commercial financing.4 
In terms of sequencing the various parts of the transaction, the referenced wholly 
separate commitment between the seller and the seller-established entity might even be 
                                                        
ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/fore-
casts/archive/ieo13/ (indicating that between 2010 and 2040 world energy demand will increase 56%, from 524 
quadrillion BTUs in 2010 to 820 quadrillion BTUs in 2040); Moming Zhou, World Energy Consumption to 
Increase 56% by 2040 Led by Asia, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 25, 2013), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2013-07-25/world-to-use-56-more-energy-by-2040-led-by-asia-eia-predicts. By com-
parison, a 2014 report from the International Energy Agency noted that total world energy consumption increased 
from 4.674 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOEs) in 1973 to 8.979 MTOEs in 2012. See INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY AGENCY, 2013: KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 28, available at http://www.iea.org/publica-
tions/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2014.pdf. 
 2. Concerning the search for traditional and newer forms of energy, see generally INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
AGENCY, CHINA’S WORLDWIDE QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY (2000), available at 
www.oecdchina.org/OECDpdf/china2000.pdf; Linda Jakobson & Zha Daojijong, China and the Worldwide 
Search for Oil Security, 13 ASIA PAC. REV. (No. 2) (2006); Alison Kemper & Roger Martin, The Rush for New 
Oil and Gas Sources is Pushing Us Towards Extreme Actions, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), www.theguard-
ian.com/sustainable-business/blog/rush-new-oil-gas-sources-extreme-measures-arctic-russia. On the search for 
locations for alternative energy activity, see generally Renewable Energy Information Services, 3TIER (providing 
maps of solar, wind, and hydro power locations), available at www.3tier.com/static/ttcms/us/images/sup-
port/maps/3tier_all_renewables_poster.pdf; on ocean thermal energy conversion activities, see WORLD ENERGY 
COUNCIL, SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES: OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION 573 (2007), available at 
www.energy.ca.gov/oceanenergy/WEC_Country_Notes_OTEC.pdf. 
 3. The mineral royalty payment generally is discussed in JUDON FAMBROUGH, REAL ESTATE CENTER, 
MINERALS, SURFACE RIGHTS AND ROYALTY PAYMENTS (2009), available at www.re-
center.tamu.edu/pdf/840.pdf. 
 4. In terms of the purchaser otherwise being priced-out of the land transaction, it is not difficult to imagine 
that either the cash flow situation of an energy entrepreneur, or its ability to secure necessary financing from a 
third party, could have the effect of preventing the accomplishment of a particular land transaction. Willingness 
on the part of the seller to essentially take a portion of the price for the purchase in the form of regular periodic 
payments linked to the use of the property for identified energy-related activities can play an important role in 
securing the completion of such transactions.   
2
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earlier in time than the sale of the land in which the entrepreneur expresses an interest, and 
might take the form of a “Declaration” or “Transfer” entered into by only the seller and 
the seller-established entity. Further, the wholly separate commitment might even be 
properly and timely recorded within the chain of title of the property eventually purchased 
and conveyed, and also be a commitment clearly and expressly referenced in the deed 
taken by the energy entrepreneur executing that purchase.5 However, despite these indicia 
of awareness of the periodic payment obligation and the corresponding suggestion of its 
inescapably obligatory nature, in the event the energy entrepreneur purchasing the land 
does not engage in the payment “triggering” energy activity, the question arises of the 
legal theory on which a successor-in-interest to the relevant land could be held bound to 
the money payment promise. After all, neither the successor-in-interest, nor the original 
energy entrepreneur, was formally a party to the “Declaration” or “Transfer” between the 
seller and the seller-established entity designated to take payments under the arrangement. 
Thus, the absence of such a contractual basis for liability would appear to draw into ques-
tion the existence of grounds for binding the successor-in-interest to the promise to make 
money payments. 
And this is far from a matter of idle curiosity. With the growth of interest in solar 
energy generating plants,6 it is conceivable owners of prime locations for the siting of solar 
plants could express interest in conveying out-right ownership of the land itself, in return 
for, among other things, regular money payments made when and if such plants are con-
structed. Likewise, as wind energy gains a larger toehold in the mix of sources of energy 
for factories, businesses, and residential accommodations,7 the most attractive locations 
for the siting of such plants might be one’s where the land owner desires to convey actual 
title to the energy entrepreneur, receiving part of the remuneration in the form of regular 
periodic cash payments in the event wind turbines or associated facilities are ever con-
structed. Similarly, with the advent of new technologies for the exploitation of previously 
hard-to-get oil and gas resources,8 it is not inconceivable that owners of land on which 
                                                        
 5. For public documents of an actual transaction involving the described situation in the context of oil stor-
age tanks, see “Royalty Interest Related to Tanks,” Filed in Lincoln County, OK (July 7, 2009), Book 1849, at 
p. 127-29 (creating a so-called royalty interest, i.e., payment interest, granting to earlier established Deeprock 
Farms, LLC the right to receive money payments in the event certain lands are used for the construction of oil 
storage tanks, and fixing on any owner of the described lands the payment obligation).  
 6. On solar energy’s growth, see generally SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, SOLAR INDUSTRY 
DATA (2014), available at www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-industry-data (in 2013 there was a 41% in-
crease in solar energy capacity over 2012, with solar accounting in 2013 for 29% of all the new electricity gen-
erating capacity added that year); U.S. RENEWABLES & CO2 EMISSIONS SUMMARY, SHORT –TERM ENERGY 
OUTLOOK (2014), available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/renew_co2.cfm (discussing solar still account-
ing for a small portion of total renewable energy production, chart reveals total BTUs generated by renewables 
in the U.S. being 8.784 quadrillion in 2014, with only .415 quads supplied by solar). 
 7. On the growth of wind energy, see generally WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, U.S. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
GROWTH ACCELERATES (2014), available at www.worldwatch.org/node/5855 (wind energy generating capacity 
in U.S. expected to grow by 7500 megawatts in 2014, a 45% increase over total available in 2013); AMERICAN 
COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE OUTLOOK FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA 7 (2014), available 
at www.acore.org/files/pdfs/ACORE_Outlook_for_RE_2014.pdf (wind power on track to account for 20% of 
power in the electricity grid by 2030). 
 8. On horizontal drilling and so-called “fracking,” see generally Wendy Koch, Fracking Puts U.S. First in 
Shale Gas Production, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/na-
tion/2013/10/23/fracking-shale-gas-us-global-leader/3170255/ (natural gas production up by one-third over 2005 
production low point); David Usborne, Fracking is Turning the U.S. into a Bigger Oil Producer than Saudi 
3
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such might be located or even stored once extracted, or owners of land where extraction 
companies might wish to bivouac equipment necessary for oil and gas activity, could link 
any such permission to the energy entrepreneur taking an out-right conveyance of the land 
itself, in return for a purchase arrangement involving, in part, regular periodic money pay-
ments in the event the land is ever used for any such energy-related activity. 
II. BRIEF COMMENT ON THE OVERALL LEGAL CONTEXT 
Prior to looking closely at the several problems associated with any effort to bind a 
successor-in-interest to an energy-related activity money payment commitment taken-on 
by an earlier promisor transferred the subject land, at least three other relevant matters 
deserve brief comment. 
The first has to do with the rule against perpetuities.9 In view of the fact the money 
payment commitment may be linked to a particular energy-related activity very likely not 
to be taking place at the time the original commitment arises, and, in fact, without any 
guarantee that such activity may ever occur, it is clear the promise to pay creates in any 
beneficiary an expectation of a future money payment that is purely contingent—uncertain 
to ever come to fruition.10 In the event the subject land becomes used for such an activity, 
the obligation to make payment is triggered. However, as noted, no assurance exists that 
such activity will occur. The contingent or uncertain nature of this commitment appears to 
make it just the kind of situation the rule against perpetuities was designed to address. 
Nonetheless, authority exists for concluding otherwise, given that the rule strikes at the 
granting of conditional interests (i.e., interests not arising until some condition has been 
met), rather than presently vested interests whose mere enjoyment depends upon some 
futurity.11 But even if such authority is found unconvincing, there seems ample room for 
the use of reformation doctrines—like cy pres and wait-and-see—to salvage the commit-
ment. And, beyond that, at the very instant the identified energy activity that triggers the 
payment obligation is in fact ever undertaken, there seems room to argue that the money 
payment commitment that may have been viewed as subject to the rule because of its con-
tingent nature is then removed from the rule by virtue of the previously contingent interest 
in payment becoming completely vested.12 After all, as originally made, the promise to 
                                                        
Arabia, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 1, 2014), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/fracking-is-turning-
the-US-into-a-bigger-oil-producer-than-saudi-arabia.9185133.html. 
 9. For a discussion of the rule against perpetuities, see generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942); Robert Lynn, A Practical Guide to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DUKE L.J. 
1 (1964); Bruce M. Kramer, Modern Applications of the Rule Against Perpetuities to Oil and Gas Transactions: 
What the Duke of Norfolk Didn’t Tell You, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 281 (1997); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities 
Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1954). See also Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, 
Preface to ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 178-229 (2d ed. 1984); Garrett Logan, Oklahoma Perpe-
tuities and Such, 7 TULSA L.J. 5 (1971).  
 10. Many jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, apply the rule against perpetuities to personal as well as real 
property. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.47 (2014); OHIO REV. STAT. § 2131.08; FLA. STAT. tit. 50 § 
689.225. 
 11. See, e.g., Commerce Bank v. Peabody Coal Co., 861 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting from 
Dauphin Island Property v. Callon Inst., 519 So. 2d 948 (Ala. 1988) (“if [a] futurity is annexed to the substance 
of the gift, it is contingent, but if annexed to the time of payment, enjoyment, or delivery of possession, it is 
vested” and, therefore, completely outside the rule against perpetuities).  
 12. Typically, the rule against perpetuities demands the meeting of its requirements from the very moment 
4
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pay was conditioned upon a particular energy-related activity occurring on the subject 
land. Once that activity is actually undertaken, the condition upon which the promise to 
pay had rested is met, thus transforming what had previously been a potential problem 
under the rule into a vested interest wholly and completely outside the operation of the 
rule.13 
The second has to do with the treatment traditionally accorded to the related situation 
of a money payment commitment in the form of the mineral royalty interest. Specifically, 
lease and royalty agreements are often clear in their applicability to successors-in-interest 
to the original obligor,14 and there is certainly case law holding such royalty interests to 
bind successors to the exploitation enterprise originally promising to make good on a com-
mitment to make royalty payments in the event of mineral exploitation.15 The effect is to 
render a successor-in-interest to a promisor entering into an obligation to make royalty 
payments for minerals taken from a royalty owners land just as responsible for following 
through on that commitment as the promisor itself. In light of the distinct similarity be-
tween mineral royalty promises, and promises by energy entrepreneurs to make money 
payments when and if land conveyed to them, or which comes under the subsequent own-
ership of their heirs, successors, assigns, or transferees, should be subjected to identified, 
non-extractive, energy-related activities, it seems advisable the standard lease and royalty 
contract law, as well as the decisional law regarding mineral royalty promises, should not 
                                                        
the instrument containing a contingent interest subject thereto is created. See Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Iowa Rule 
Against Perpetuities—Reforms at Last, Restatement Style: Wait-and-See and Cy Pres, 69 IOWA L. REV. 705, 706 
(1984). Nonetheless, the rule has traditionally contained a so-called “second look” doctrine, at least in the context 
of powers of appointment. This “second look” doctrine saves grants of appointment powers that would otherwise 
contravene the rule by virtue of looking at the facts as they exist, not as of the time of creation, but at a later point 
in time when a dispute arises. For an interesting application of the overall rule against perpetuities in the context 
of Oklahoma law and a dispute concerning an option to purchase oil and gas that might be produced at some 
undetermined future date. See Greenshields v. Warren Petro. Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 70-71 (10th Cir. 1957).  
 13. The rule against perpetuities, as well as the rule in Shelley’s Case, the doctrine of worthier, the rule on 
destructibility of contingent remainders, and the rule against the transferability of possibilities of reverter and 
powers of termination were all formulated to evidence the common law’s disfavor of future interests that were 
contingent, questionable, or uncertain to occur. For a case involving a possibility of reverter in which the court 
took essentially the approach that, once an identified triggering event giving rise to the reverter actually occurred, 
the contingent interest became vested and, therefore, was no longer subject to the rule preventing the inter vivos 
transferability of possibilities of reverter. See Mahrenholz v. Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 466 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1984) (whenever the event making the reverter a contingency occurs, the future interest becomes vested and, 
thus, outside the rule against its inter vivos transferability).  
  On a related point, if the originally contingent commitment was known to exist by one who could have 
challenged it as in contravention of the rule against perpetuities, but no challenge was initiated at that time, and 
the interest subject to that commitment was then later transferred to others who also had notice but chose not to 
raise the rule, it is not inconceivable that one seeking to enforce the payment commitment after the occurrence 
of the requisite triggering event might have available the claim of laches or estoppel in the event perpetuities is 
then raised as a reason for viewing the commitment as unenforceable. 
 14. See, e.g., Sec. 10 of Texas Sample Oil and Gas Lease and Surface Use Agreement (June 2011, Texas Oil 
& Gas Accountability Project), available at www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/Texas-Sample-Model-
Gas-Lease_201106.pdf. 
 15. Interesting decisions speaking in such terms include Local Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Eckroat et. al., 100 
P.2d 261, 262 (Okla. 1940) (“an agreement to pay a lessor, . . . . sums of money to be derived from the sale of 
oil when the same shall be produced from the leased premises touches and concerns the land very materially 
and . . . constitute a real covenant, or covenant running with the land. . . . A covenant running . . . is one relating 
to the land, . . . . so that its benefit or obligation passes with the ownership.”) (Emphasis added). See also Mont-
gomery v. Hickok, 188 Ill.App. 348 (1914); Holliday v. Erwin, 85 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Danciger 
Oil & Refining Co. v. Christian, 109 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App 1937). 
5
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be overlooked. 
The third, and final, matter deserving comment has to do with the basic legal prin-
ciples discussed in the balance of this essay—the principles concerning the law of real 
covenants and equitable servitudes. While normally there is a degree of reluctance to hold 
that a promise made by one entity can be found to obligate another who was not a party to 
the promise itself, the ultimate effect of the law of real covenants and equitable servitudes 
is to explain how others so situated can be found committed to fulfil promises they them-
selves did not make.16 With regard to the law of covenants and servitudes, a couple of 
points are in order. 
An initial point might be that, one place to begin is with the Restatement (Third’s) 
suggestion that all such situations are best analyzed from the standpoint of emphasizing 
the notion of servitudes, rather than that of real covenants.17 The attractiveness of this 
approach is perhaps best explained by the fact the law of servitudes has emerged over the 
centuries as part of equity, and, therefore, has not been subjected to the somewhat stricter 
standards applied to the enforcement of real covenants at law.18 It is at least of some rele-
vance to keep in mind here that the remedy customarily available at equity when seeking 
to enforce a commitment as a servitude would be that of injunction. If what is preferred is 
the remedy of damages, such would typically be within the cognizance of law, and en-
forcement would be under the guise of the commitment or promise as a real covenant, not 
an equitable servitude.19 
The other point needing to be made has to do with what might be described as the 
basic elements of the prima facie case for demonstrating that a successor-in-interest to the 
energy entrepreneur can be bound by that entrepreneur’s energy-related activity money 
payment commitment. Though enunciated, arranged, or numbered differently by the vari-
ous courts and scholars of covenants and servitudes,20 the fundamentals of such a case in 
the context of a real covenant would be (1) an enforceable commitment or promise, (2) 
that touches and concerns land transferred, (3) is intended to run to any successor-in-in-
terest to the land, (4) when there is both horizontal privity between the original parties to 
the promise or commitment, and vertical privity between those parties and any successors-
                                                        
 16. For the law on real covenants and equitable servitudes generally, see Percy Bordwell, The Running of 
Covenants—No Anomaly, 36 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1950); William B. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical 
Primmer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861 (1977). On the notion of binding persons who did not themselves make the 
promise, see James Barr Ames, Specific Performance For and Against Stranger to the Contract, 17 HARV. L. 
REV. 174, 177-79 (1904); Harlan F. Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 
COLUM. L. REV. 291, 294-96 (1918); William F. Walsh, Equitable Easements and Restrictions, 2 ROCKY MTN. 
L. REV. 234, 236 (1930); RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 671 (abridged 
ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 539 cmt. a (1944). 
 17. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (2000). 
 18. On the more relaxed approach to enforcing commitments as servitudes, rather than covenants, see gener-
ally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.22, 
485-86 (1984).  
 19. On the relationship between the remedy sought, and the commitment or promise said to give rise to the 
remedy being a servitude or covenant, see generally id. at §§ 8.21 & 8.31. Also, note the use of the term “typi-
cally,” as there may be circumstances in which damages may be sought in the context of an equitable servitude. 
Id. 
 20. For instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court speaks of three elements. See Beattie v. State, ex rel. Grand 
River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 387-89 (Okla. 2002) (Opala, J., concurring). 
6
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in-interests to them, and (5) notice of the commitment or promise exists on the part of the 
successors.21 Reflective of the more relaxed approach regarding holding successors-in-
interest under the principles applicable to equitable servitudes, courts exercising their eq-
uitable jurisdiction have eliminated the requirement of having to demonstrate privity de-
manded by element (4), thereby placing greater emphasis especially on both the elements 
of notice and touch and concern.22 
It is also important to note that the problem with which we are here concerned is one 
involving whether the “burden” said to arise against the energy entrepreneur is capable of 
“running” to the successor-in-interest to the land taken by the entrepreneur, and not with 
whether the payment “benefit” incident to that burden can be enforced by someone other 
than its original beneficiary. As described above, the seller of the property subjected to the 
payment burden could have initially granted that benefit to a seller-established entity, 
where the benefit remains. And though in the time leading-up to the sale of the property 
of concern, the burden to make regular and periodic money payment in the event of iden-
tified energy-related activities applied even to the eventual seller, once a sale occurs, the 
only question is whether the energy entrepreneur who executed the purchase, or that en-
trepreneur’s successors-in-interest, face that same burden “running” to them? 
III. DOES A PROMISE TO PAY MONEY “TOUCH AND CONCERN” THE LAND? 
Given that any promise to make money payment in the event of land use for certain 
energy-related activities is a burden that does not obviously appear to be a burden designed 
to affect, relate to, or be centered upon land as such, it seems qualitatively different from 
the usual burden that is found to touch and concern land—e.g., a burden not to erect a 
chain-link fence on land conveyed to the promisor, or to adhere to the commitment to use 
only wood shingles when roofing a residence conveyed to the promisor. As a result of this 
difference, authority can be found for the proposition that a promise or commitment to pay 
money is not a burden that satisfies the requirement that there exist a burden that touches 
and concerns land.23 Authority following that line of reasoning would include Vulcan Ma-
terials Co. v. Miller, where the court found the element of touch and concern not to exist—
so as to allow a burden to run to a successor-in-interest—because the promise or commit-
ment involved was not about, related to, or centered upon burdening land. The promise or 
commitment was regarded as purely personal to the one who made it.24 
Further, as promises to pay money are also affirmative in nature, and covenants or 
servitudes found to touch and concern land usually tend to be negative—a commitment 
                                                        
 21. Spenser’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583), is often cited as the original authority for these basic ele-
ments. 
 22. The case often cited here as the lead authority for the elimination of privity, and for the emphasis on 
notice, is the old English case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). 
 23. See Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938) (per 
Lehman, J.) (noting that “[i]t has been often said that a covenant to pay a sum of money is a personal affirmative 
covenant which usually does not concern or touch the land”).  
 24. See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Miller, 691 So. 2d 908 (Miss. 1997) (obligation to make limestone royalty 
payments personal and do not run). See also Burton v. Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 57 S.E.2d 904 (Va. 
1950) (promise to pay insurance personal and does not run). 
7
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not to do something on or not to use in a certain way a particular piece of land—an addi-
tional problem seems faced by any promise to pay money when and if property is subjected 
to identified energy-related activity. Important early cases discussing the significance of 
the affirmative nature of a covenant or servitude include Miller v. Clary, where the court 
recognized that the historic English disinclination to hold affirmative commitments as 
touching and concerning land has been criticized,25 and Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York v. New York & Queens County Ry. Co., in which adherence to 
the view that affirmative commitments fail to touch and concern the land was nonetheless 
endorsed.26 
Despite these two concerns, there is good reason to find that any promise by a pur-
chaser of land to make regular and periodic money payments in the event land sold to them 
is ever used for energy activity clearly gives rise to a burden that touches and concerns the 
relevant land. To begin with, though such a promise is ineluctably affirmative, even com-
mitments familiarly negative in nature contain the affirmative commitment to use the prop-
erty of concern in a way that results in the negative commitment not being contravened. 
And the reverse would be equally so in the context of a commitment that is affirmative. In 
short, since every negative or affirmative commitment necessarily contains its mirror op-
posite, it seems that whether a commitment is to be found to touch and concern land is best 
divined by inquiring as to whether the commitment is tied to, linked to, or has as its prin-
cipal objective imposing a burden that emerges out of something regarding land transferred 
to the promisor. 
And with respect to the commitment or promise being one to pay money, again, it is 
equally clear that some commitments of that sort may have nothing to do with matters 
regarding land that has been conveyed to the promisor. That would certainly be the case if 
the money payment promise were something like obligating the receiver of such conveyed 
land to make regular gifts to a favored charity of the conveyor, irrespective of the uses to 
which the promisor may be putting the conveyed land. While such promises are to be 
viewed as independent of land that has been purchased by the promisor (i.e., commitments 
that stand alone and have no connection to any land acquired), promises to pay which are 
triggered by, or depend upon, or are linked to use of conveyed land in a certain way are 
unquestionably capable of being found to touch and concern land. After all, it is because 
conveyed land is employed in some particular way that one’s obligation to make money 
payments is activated. 
Perhaps the seminal case involving direct confrontation of whether the element of 
“touch and concern” is met by an affirmative obligation to pay money is Neponsit Property 
Owners’ Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank.27 In that case, each prop-
erty owner purchasing in a particular housing subdivision committed to making regular 
and periodic money payments to the home owners’ association for the purposes of, among 
other things, maintenance of “common” or “green” areas, available to all homeowners in 
the burdened subdivision. Observing that the situation raised both the nature of the com-
mitment as merely affirmative, and involved an obligation to do nothing more than merely 
                                                        
 25. See Miller v. Clary, 103 N.E. 1114 (N.Y. 1913). 
 26. See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. N.Y. & Queens Cnty. Ry. Co., 170 N.E. 887, 892 (N.Y. 1930). 
 27. See Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d 793.  
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pay money, the court nonetheless determined the promise to be one which touched and 
concerned the relevant land acquired by the promisor. 
Consistent with what had been expressed above, Justice Lehman, in writing for the 
court, stressed that it was much more important to look at the connection of the promise 
made to the land conveyed than at whether the promise concerned an affirmative commit-
ment or one simply to pay money. As he stated, a commitment by a promisor touches and 
concerns land and can run to successors-in-interest when the commitment “affect[s] the 
legal relations . . . of the parties to the covenant, as owners of particular parcels of land 
and not merely as members of the community in general.”28 In further elaboration, he noted 
the following: “A promise to pay for something to be done in connection with the promi-
sor’s land does not differ essentially from a promise by the promisor to do the thing him-
self, and both constitute, in a substantial sense, a restriction upon the owners right to use 
the land, and a burden upon the legal interest of the owner.”29 
The last set of emphasized language from Lehman’s opinion calls for focusing at-
tention on the connection between the obligation to pay money and the land conveyed to 
the promisor. In the context of Neponsit, the connection was that, as long as one continued 
to be a homeowner in the burdened subdivision, the conveyee of the land was to be bound 
by the commitment to make regular and periodic homeowner association money pay-
ments. Though there can be no question that the fulfillment of the obligation would re-
dound to the benefit of the promisor making the payments (as the common areas and green 
space remained available to them), it is equally significant that the obligation to make 
payment attaches or arises because the promisor continued as an owner of a particular 
parcel of land in the burdened subdivision. Stressing the later notion, by linking payments 
to an association of homeowners and homeownership in the burdened subdivision, the idea 
is to suggest that the payment obligation touches and concerns land when it is taken on 
due to the land being owned by one. In the words of Neponsit, continuing ownership of 
land in the burdened subdivision results in the affirmative promise to pay money being a 
“promise to pay for something . . . in connection with the promisor’s land.”30 
With regard to our instant problem of payments triggered by use of purchased land 
for an energy activity, an even more direct and immediate connection exists between the 
payment commitment and ownership of particular parcels of land. In other words, while 
in Neponsit it was sufficient that ownership of land continued in the burdened subdivision, 
in our instant problem, one faces the obligation to make money payments, not simply due 
to continuing land ownership, but because land owned by one is subjected to a certain use. 
No payment obligation exists apart from a specified use of particular parcels of owned 
land. Stated another way, the money payment obligation is clearly connected to particular 
uses to which the subject land is put. In the absence of such uses of the conveyed land 
occurring, no obligation attaches. It is only because of what takes place on the conveyed 
land that payment must be made. A promise of this nature undoubtedly touches and con-
cerns the relevant land. It is an obligation that plainly relates to, is about, or is focused on 
what occurs on certain lands. 
                                                        
 28. See id. at 796 (emphasis added). 
 29. See id. (emphasis added). 
 30. See id. 
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A SUCCESSOR TAKING A DIFFERENT “QUANTITY” OF LAND 
THAN ORIGINALLY BOUND 
In the context of our hypothetical situation involving a promise to pay money when, 
and if, particular parcels of land that have been transferred to the promisor are ever used 
for identified energy-related activities (e.g., the erection of wind turbines or an array of 
solar energy collectors, etc.), it is quite possible that a successor to the promisor ap-
proached about such payments may attempt to escape “runnability” as a result of having 
taken a subsequent transfer of something less than the total quantity of land originally 
subjected to the payment burden. Imagine a situation in which the transfer subjected to 
that burden was for, say, one-hundred acres, and the party now faced with the demand for 
payment is a successor-in-interest who has taken only twenty of the entire initially bound 
acreage. It is certainly true that the very language of the instrument creating the payment 
obligation might be structured in a way that the promise to pay would not be intended to 
survive a division of the entire initially bound acreage, with the result that such a division 
would terminate the burden and relieve the transferee of the smaller quantum of land of a 
promise to pay otherwise capable of running to the successor-in-interest. To conclude oth-
erwise would be to denigrate and contravene the parties’ clearly expressed intention. But 
what if the language of the instrument of creation revealed no such intention? What if its 
wording left open the possibility that the promise to pay bound all one-hundred acres of 
land, whether that land remained together as a single entirety or was split into numerous 
smaller parcels? Would the mere fact that a successor had taken less than the entire acreage 
originally bound serve to relieve the successor from an obligation that would otherwise 
run? 
Now, in the event the actual legal interest in the burdened land held by the successor 
were of a lesser quality, e.g., a life estate, while the predecessor-in-interest of the originally 
burdened land received a fee simple estate, there might appear at least some reason to 
contend the successor is not subject to the promise to pay. After all, the predecessor-in-
interest, as the initially burdened transferee of the subject land, embraced that payment 
obligation in connection with having taken an estate of a particular quality. And, while 
that money payment obligation attached to and was generally able to pass along with that 
specific estate in land, a transfer by the initially burdened purchaser to a successor-in-
interest taking an estate of a lesser quality in the subject land would suggest the successor 
has been afforded the argument that it escapes the obligation by virtue of not receiving an 
estate of sufficient adequacy to which such a burden could attach. There are certainly at 
least some areas of the law of real property where such a consequential implication pro-
ceeds from receipt of an estate of lesser quality. In that regard, reference can be made to 
the law surrounding the so-called doctrine of worthier title, which required in its original 
form that heirs of a devisor or grantor take by way of descent, rather than by way of devise 
or a conveyed remainder, so long as the estate in land they were to receive was of the same 
kind and quality as would be received by descent.31 But just as under what has become 
                                                        
 31. See generally CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 149–52 
(1962). It bears noting that in American law the doctrine has two distinct branches: the wills branch and the inter 
vivos branch. While in most respects the wills branch is regarded as moribund, Moynihan references authority 
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referenced in American law as the inter vivos branch of that doctrine, it would not seem 
impossible for an instrument of transfer involving land and energy-related activities to 
structure the terms of the promise to pay to make clear an intent it is to run to successors, 
in spite of their having taken an estate in land of a lesser quality. A clear indication of 
devisor or conveyor intent that an heir take by way of devise or conveyance instead of 
descent permits that intent to be given effect under worthier title,32 suggesting, perhaps, 
the same result would not be unreasonably expected in connection with a promise to pay 
associated with energy-related activities, where the language of the promise is crystal clear 
an estate of a different quality serves as no impediment.33 
When the quality of the estate in land parallels that initially transferred, yet the quan-
tity of land passed between the original promisor and that promisor’s successor-in-interest 
is in an amount less than initially bound, the law finds that not to be an impediment to the 
runnability of the money payment burden. In discussing the matter of a lesser quantity of 
land being passed, no less an authority than the celebrated property law expert and late-
Professor Richard Powell of Columbia University makes clear that an obligation binding 
certain lands does not have its capacity to run with those lands impeded when a successor-
in-interest takes a lesser quantity than the entirety of lands originally bound at the outset. 
In discussing this question, he notes that there may be some complications arising from 
whether the burden imposed on the land is negative in nature (e.g., no chain-link fences), 
or an affirmative one to render services or pay money. In situations of the former sort, he 
concludes that “all segments of the originally burdened area” carry the burden.34 As for 
situations involving the provision of services or the payment of money, he speaks in terms 
of some sort of pro rata “division of . . . [the] affirmative burdens.”35 Significantly, in both 
types of cases, the burden still runs, despite the fact a successor-in-interest receives a lesser 
quantity of land than that originally bound. Further, in our hypothetical concerning the 
payment of money for uses of land for energy-related activities, there may be no need to 
think in terms of a pro rata division, if the money payment obligation is cast in such a way 
that a specific fixed sum is owing for each wind turbine, or solar array erected on a plot of 
land. 
The persuasiveness of Professor Powell on this point is corroborated by the fact that 
the law of covenants and servitudes shares much, as will be addressed below in greater 
detail, with the law of easements—as both are incorporeal hereditaments, non-possessory 
interests in the lands of another.36 And, under the principles governing that latter body of 
law, good reason exists to believe that, when a larger section of land transferred to another 
is fastened with the burden of bearing an easement by reservation or exception in favor of 
                                                        
under that branch for holding the doctrine inapplicable not just to situations in which a different quality of estate 
is involved in the devise or conveyance, but also in which a different quantity of land would pass than under 
descent itself. See id. at 153.   
 32. See id. at 154–59. 
 33. Cf. JON BRUCE AND JAMES ELY, JR. CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE MODERN LAW OF PROPERTY 375 
(6th ed 2007) (indicating transfer of a different type of estate can cause complications in the runnability of a 
covenant, due to questions of whether adequate vertical privity exists).  
 34. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 731 (abridged ed. 1968). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
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the transferor, and then that land is later subdivided, successors-in-interest to relevant por-
tions of the larger originally burdened land are to be held subject to the easement rights of 
the entity in possession of the dominant estate.37 Presumably, the conveyance of the orig-
inally burdened larger section of land would be listed as of record as being subject to the 
retained easement. Successors to lesser portions of the affected land would therefore be on 
notice of the easement. Yet even in the event there is no record of the easement’s burden, 
there are other factual circumstances that could serve equally as well to put successors-in-
interest on actual or inquiry notice of the burden, thereby assuring they remain just as 
subject to the easement as the original servient landowner would have been had lesser 
portions never been carved from the larger holding.38 
With the preceding in-mind, there is a distinct, yet somewhat related matter that 
bears comment. As already observed, though it might be argued that the law should not 
favor the runnability of burdens when a successsor-in-interest to the original purchaser and 
promisor takes an estate in land of lesser quality than received by the promisor, there ap-
pear no qualms regarding runnability when a successor taking an estate of the same quality 
has been transferred simply a lesser quantity of land than taken at the obligation’s outset. 
In contradistinction to this, the matter presently deserving comment has to do with the fact 
that, irrespective of whether a lesser quantum of land is transferred to a successor, or an 
estate of lesser quality is transferred, whenever a transfer has taken place, it may be won-
dered whether the original promisor (or any successors intervening between the original 
                                                        
 37. Obviously, it would be much more onerous to hold that the owner of the servient estate subject to an 
easement would have to bear the effects of additional usage arising from a subdivision of the dominant estate. 
Yet courts have seen fit to so rule, as long as the additional usage resulting from such subdivision does not 
unreasonably increase (“surcharge”) the burden on the servient land owner, see, e.g., Cushman Virginia Corp. v. 
Barnes, 129 SE 2d 633, 640 (Sup. Ct. Va. 1963) (holding that subdivision does not, in and of itself, prove to 
increase unreasonably the burden borne by the servient land owner). In view of that fact, it would appear sensible 
to assume that, as long as those taking portions of a larger tract of land subjected to an easement have notice of 
the easement’s existence, then that they take only a portion of the larger land across which such an easement runs 
should in no way prevent them from being subject thereto. If a servient land owner must bear some burden of 
increased easement usage associated with a subdivision of a dominant tenement, and a taker of the entirety of a 
servient estate must bear the undoubted burden of an easement running completely across its land, how is it 
possible that a transferee of a subdivided portion of land across which an easement runs can be said unbound by 
burdens inherent in that easement? For a decision not directly reaching that point, but certainly intimating it in 
regard to a covenant or servitude, see Moseley v. Bishop, 470 N.E. 2d 773 (Ct. of App. Ind. 1984) (promise to 
maintain a drain servicing a dominant estate running across an adjoining land owner’s servient estate, with por-
tions of the latter being subdivided into sixteen lots all passed to separate transferees, the original servient estate 
owner, transferor, and its successors retaining ownership of all portions of the lot where the drain was located). 
In considering the question of whether a successor-in-interest to the original servient estate owner continued to 
be burdened by that drain maintenance promise, the court held the promise not applicable to the owners of the 
sixteen other subdivided lots, presumably because the drain itself did not cross their properties, but only that held 
by the successor to the original promisor. See id. at 778 (stating that that trial court was correct in holding the 
maintenance promise “does not affect the other [sixteen] defendants’ propert[ies]”). For a similar case, see Jack-
vony v. Poncelet, 584 A. 2d 1112 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1991) (grantor of an easement across land grantor retains later 
subdivides that burdened land with court acknowledging transferees of affected subdivided lots remain subject 
to the easement’s burden). The principal issue in that case, however, revolved around whether the owner of the 
dominant tenement, in entering into an earlier partial release arrangement effected a release of its entire easement 
interest.  
 38. See Sluyter v. Hale Fireworks Partnership, 262 SW 3d 154 (Sup. Ct. Ark. 2007) (for the notion that unless 
there exists termination by its express terms, or release, or merger, or prescription by the servient estate, or 
conveyance of the servient estate to one having no actual, constructive, or inquiry notice, termination of the 
burden of an easement is difficult to demonstrate).  
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promisor and the successor-in-interest eventually looked to for the promised money pay-
ment) may have a form of continuing liability? In other words, in the event an original 
promisor has transferred the burdened land away, is the party anticipating that it will be 
the beneficiary of the promised payment in any sort of position to be able to select against 
whom it will proceed, including, possibly, the original promisor, intervening transferees 
of the land, or the entity in whose hands the land now resides? Restated, once one has 
taken land burdened by a running promise to pay money, does the original promisor and 
the subsequent taker remain potentially liable even after the land of concern has been sub-
sequently transferred to a new successor-in-interest? 
By one theory, the initial purchaser of the land burdened by the promise to make the 
money payment would seem always to be liable on the basis of contract.39 With a promise 
taken on by an initial purchaser, privity of contract is extant, and the passage of the land 
between that purchaser and the seller establishes privity of estate as well. Unless the terms 
of the contract from which the promise arose provided expressly, or by implication, that 
the initial purchaser’s commitment regarding payment terminated upon the relevant land 
being transferred to a successor-in-interest, the refusal of a successor to make the requisite 
payment would appear to leave the initial purchaser vulnerable on the basis of their con-
tinuing contractual privity. Especially would this seem to be the case in a situation in which 
the payment obligation were activated by the initial purchaser undertaking the triggering 
event (i.e., the energy-related use) while the property were under the title and ownership 
of one who had taken by way of a subsequent follow-on transfer. Whether this would also 
be the case in the event it were a successor-in-interest, and not the original purchaser, who 
executed the identified energy-related activity, would seem to turn on consideration of a 
couple of important factors. The first would be whether the specific wording of the original 
promise itself was encompassing enough to hold the initial purchaser upon the acts of 
another. And the second, whether it would seem fair, in light of whatever wording does 
appear regarding the promise, and in light of the fact that continuing liability might have 
the effect of discouraging the making of otherwise socially beneficial promises, to hold 
the initial purchaser responsible for acts of one not under its control and executed on lands 
in which that purchaser no longer holds any interest. One such instance in which continu-
ing liability would have a certain appeal would involve an initial purchaser engaging in 
conduct triggering the payment obligation and then immediately attempting to off-load 
that obligation by transferring the concerned land to another. 
Some jurisdictions have adopted statutes impeding the possibility of continuing lia-
bility. Most such statutes turn on rejecting liability when based simply on the fact of one 
having had land subject to a burden capable of running.40 Further, though exceptions based 
                                                        
 39. For a case in which this sort of result was reached, see Grange Co. v. Simmons, 203 Cal. App. 2d 567, 
573 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding the original promissor and its later grantee to the terms of a covenant, in 
part because of the original promissor’s fraudulent behavior vis-à-vis its later grantee). See also London Cnty. 
Council v. Allen, L.R. (1914) 3 K.B. 642 (Ct. of App. 1914) (noting, in dictum, that, in a dispute between a 
covenantee and the successor to an original covenantor who had made certain promises violated by the successor 
regarding the use of property, “[i]t is clear that the covenantee may sue the covenantor himself though the former 
has parted with the land to which the covenant relates”).   
 40. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1466; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-12-5 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-29. 
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on other unusual circumstances exist, the case law generally suggests that in many in-
stances where continuing liability is raised courts are not inclined to establish such on the 
part of the initial purchaser.41 However, both the statutes addressing this matter, and the 
slim case law that appears, are susceptible to the possibility of continuing liability in the 
event surrounding circumstances so warrant. 
A slightly more equivocal answer would have to be given as to whether the party 
expecting to benefit from the promised money payment is merely left in a position of se-
lecting from among several potential entities against whom it may choose to proceed. Cer-
tainly, by its very nature, as a transfer of the burdened land results in someone other than 
the original purchaser undertaking the energy-related activity that serves to trigger the 
payment obligation, it makes most sense to understand the party undertaking the activity 
as being the one that initially should be looked to for payment. As noted in the preceding 
paragraph, however, that does not mean there is a complete absence of potential liability 
on the part of the initial promising purchaser. Barring appropriate language in that party’s 
contract, their liability would always obtain. What it does mean, however, is that the suc-
cessor-in-interest undertaking the triggering activity is the one that is to be looked to at the 
outset. 
Concerning potential liability for intervening successors-in-interest after they have 
divested themselves of the burdened land, it would seem that as long as they themselves 
undertook none of the relevant energy-related activities during their period of ownership, 
they should not be looked to for payment triggered by the activities of their own succes-
sors. It is that successor party that has primary liability. The original purchaser who has 
made the promise remains liable on the basis of their specific contract for payment, but if 
there is to be any possibility of viewing an intervening successor-in-interest as even sec-
ondarily liable for payment triggered by energy-related activities of its own successor, 
such would have to rest on some conception akin to that of how an “assumption” of a 
mortgage (as opposed to taking “subject to” a mortgage) establishes continuing liability 
on the part of intervening holders of mortgaged property. Stated in another way, unless 
there appears some language in the original declaration of the payment obligation, or in a 
subsequent writing by which any and all intervening successors consent to be bound even 
after they have transferred the relevant land away, they should not be held to have contin-
uing liability. 
 
V. THE FACT THE PROMISE TO PAY IS CONTAINED IN AN INSTRUMENT SEPARATE FROM 
THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE 
Typically, a promise burdening land taken through conveyance by one who makes 
the promise involves a situation in which the deed of conveyance either recites the actual 
promise itself or at least incorporates such by reference to an earlier instrument articulating 
the promise and properly recorded in the chain of title.42 Illustrative of the typical situation 
                                                        
 41. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Vinson v. Meridian Masonic 
Temple Bldg. Ass’n, 475 So. 2d 807 (Miss. 1985). 
 42. Examples of the typical case where restriction is imposed at the time a deed conveyed would include: 
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is the classic subdivision restriction. There, it is not uncommon for the subdivision devel-
oper, who at first owns the entire subdivision, to record a subdivision plat with the accom-
panying promises of restriction to which each lot within the subdivision is to be subjected. 
Thereafter, when the already restricted lots then held by the developer are sold to individ-
ual purchasers buying within the subdivision, the deeds of conveyance cross-reference the 
previously established and recorded restrictions.43 In the event someone other than your 
typical developer wishes to sell one or more lots they happen to own, placing the lots sold 
under restriction, the deeds of conveyance themselves will contain the language that obli-
gates the purchasers to adhere to certain promises that burden the land they take. In the 
absence of sufficient acreage to create a subdivision, a plat with accompanying subdivision 
restrictions will not be filed before-hand.44 It should be noted that, whether focus is cast 
on the small-scale seller or large-scale real estate developer, in both cases the promise 
burdening the land conveyed appears either in the instrument of conveyance, or in an ear-
lier filing within the chain of title. 
Regarding our present hypothetical involving the promise to make payments in the 
event of certain energy-related activities, the promise is said to have arisen by virtue of an 
initial Declaration or Transfer of the benefit of that promise. The Declaration or Transfer 
of the benefit was said to be vested in an entity created or established by an owner of lands 
from which an energy entrepreneur would later take a conveyance subject to the obligation 
to make the relevant payments in the event of undertaking on those lands specified energy-
related activities. In other words, there was first the articulation in a separate instrument 
of a promise to pay money to an entity created or established by an owner of lands, in the 
event such lands were ever used for certain energy-related activities, and then a later con-
veyance of the lands subjected to that promise to an energy entrepreneur who would even-
tually use the lands concerned for the specified activities. 
Clearly, our situation here differs from the situation in which a small-scale seller of 
a few lots of land simply inserts in the deed of transfer language of a promise obligating 
the purchaser of any lot to comply with some specified burden. In such a situation, there 
is simultaneity about both the promise and the conveyance of the land to which the promise 
obtains. The burden containing the promise arises at the very same time the deed executing 
the conveyance is drafted and passed to another. With respect to our hypothetical situation, 
                                                        
Blackard v. Good, 248 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1952) (restriction prohibiting construction of animal hospital); Frey v. 
Poynor, 369 P.2d 168 (Okla. 1962) (restriction of no “gas station” contained in but not in earlier filed subdivision 
plat); Crowell v. Shelton, 948 P.2d 313 (Okla. 1997) (land not to be used for residences); Caullett v. Stanley 
Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. 1961) (restriction in deed, but court has concerns about whether it is too 
ambiguous to find enforceable). 
 43. For subdivision cases, see Sw. Petroleum Co. v. Logan, 71 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1937) (deed cross-references 
restriction appearing in earlier filed subdivision plat); W.P. Morton v. Clearview Homes, Inc., 324 P.2d 543 
(Okla. 1958) (subdivision looks towards recorded plat and recorded restrictions, but at time of conveyance to the 
purchaser to be under the burden, restrictions not yet recorded—nonetheless court found purchaser to be bound 
because of purchaser’s actual notice); McHuron v. Grand Teton Lodge Co., 899 P.2d 38 (Wyo. 1995) (though 
restriction subject to questions of clarity, it was contained in earlier filed subdivision plat cross-referenced in 
deed); Christiansen v. Casey, 613 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (filed subdivision restrictions argued as 
binding a later lot owner, and court struggles with whether original developer, no longer holding any lots in the 
restricted subdivision, can sue to enforce such).   
 44. For such a case, see Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E. 2d 177 (N.C. 1992). See also Caullett, 170 A.2d 52; 
Crowell, 948 P.2d 313. 
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however, the promise arises earlier, in an instrument entirely separate and distinct from 
the later transferred deed of conveyance. No simultaneity exists at all. The promise, result-
ing in the burden to which the transferee of land is subjected, appears in a far earlier and 
entirely separate instrument from the deed actually transferring the land. It might be 
thought that this difference should impair the effectiveness of the burden’s money payment 
commitment.45 However, a couple of reasons indicate otherwise. 
First, though admittedly distinct from the small-scale seller situation, the facts of our 
hypothetical energy-related activity situation shares much with instances involving the 
typical large-scale subdivision developer. In particular, the latter involves promises that 
were, just as with the instant energy hypothetical, set out earlier and contained in, or ac-
companying, a filed subdivision plat. Little appears in the later drafted and transferred 
deed of conveyance about the promises, other than a cross-reference to their existence in 
the official filings in the land records. Yet, in spite of the complete separation between the 
earlier instrument containing the land-burdening promises, and the later transferred deed 
of conveyance, questions have never surfaced about whether the earlier and separate nature 
of the promises compromised the legal effectiveness of such subdivision restrictions to 
which they gave rise. The fact the earlier and separately created promises establishing the 
restrictions were properly and timely recorded within the chain of title of the land con-
cerned, and then further cross-referenced in the deed of conveyance, later transferring that 
same land to one sought now to be obligated, has been treated as more than sufficient to 
                                                        
 45. For an old case in which the absence of simultaneity between the deed of conveyance and the promise to 
observe a certain obligation proved fatal to the contention the promise was a covenant or servitude, see Wheeler 
v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871), reprinted in JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PROPERTY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 638 (4th ed. 1978) (deed conveyed and then a few days thereafter the seller of the land enters into a 
commitment whereby the earlier purchaser agrees to pay half the cost of future maintenance of a dam on the 
conveyed property, with court holding such promise to be purely contractual, and not one rising to the level of a 
real covenant or equitable servitude). Interesting language from the opinion would include the language about 
the deed being first conveyed and then a few days later the relevant promise being contractually agreed to, and 
then noting that “[u]nless they constituted one instrument or transaction, it cannot be claimed that the covenants 
of the agreement run with the land so as to charge the grantee of the covenantor.” id. at 639. Given that the seller 
in Wheeler had earlier conveyed the land to the person who would later be asserted as bound by their subsequent 
promise regarding partial payment of maintenance costs related to that land, the court opined: “Did the [seller] 
in this case have any estate in the land owned by the defendant at the time this agreement was entered into? It is 
not even claimed they had.” id. at 640. As the court went on, the subsequently made promise of payment was “a 
mere contract,” not a covenant or servitude attaching to and running with the land. What is critical to note re-
garding Wheeler is that it finds a fatal flaw with the attempted covenant or servitude because of the absence of 
what we have earlier referenced as “horizontal” privity. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
  Traditionally, the requirement of “horizontal privity” meant that there either had to be a continuing rela-
tionship between a transferor and transferee (i.e., a landlord and tenant relationship) or a least a promise (i.e., 
covenant) made at the very instant that a conveyance of land was made to the promisor. Under such a test, it is 
obvious that the gap in time of the few days involved in Wheeler between the conveyance of the deed and the 
making of the promise to pay maintenance costs would fail to satisfy the horizontal privity requirement. Mod-
ernly, however, courts are not so strict in insisting on so-called “instantaneous” privity. Indeed, there is some 
authority for the view that one need not even worry about any sort of “horizontal” privity when the question that 
arise concerns simply the running of the benefit side of a covenant. See, e.g., City of Reno v. Matley, 378 P.2d 
256 (Nev. 1963); 3 HERBERT TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROP. § 849 (3d ed. 1939). The same relaxed attitude, 
though, would not obtain in the context of a question about the running of the burden side. Further, it would seem 
enough, even in the absence of privity of an “instantaneous” sort, if a promise were made in the context of, or in 
relation to, a conveyance of an interest in land, whether shortly before or shortly after the actual passage of the 
deed itself. After all, in the event that such a promise were properly recorded within the chain of title of land 
which, like in Wheeler, had been earlier conveyed, then anyone searching the chain of title in contemplation of 
a purchase of the property that had been fixed with that promise would have notice thereof.  
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eliminate questions of its enforceability. Since both the subdivision and the energy situa-
tions involve instances where the earlier and separate promises serve initially to obligate 
even the very entity creating the promises, that entity actually holds the relevant land when 
the promises are made, and the land burdened by those promises is then later passed to one 
succeeding to the original owner,46 the fact the subdivision situation has been seen as en-
forceable indicates the same results obtain in connection with our energy hypothetical. 
A second reason to discount the significance that the promise involved in our hypo-
thetical energy situation arises earlier, and in a separate instrument than the deed convey-
ing the subject property, concerns the implication flowing from viewing it otherwise. For 
instance, if it were to be said that the absence of simultaneity between the making of the 
promise creating the payment burden and the formal conveyance of the deed transferring 
the subject land somehow impaired the ability of the promise to be legally enforced, that 
would result in an entity against whom enforcement was sought being able to shake off an 
obligation of which it otherwise had indisputable and unequivocal notice.47 In purchasing 
the subject land, the purchaser, and all successors-in-interest, must be charged with know-
ing what a search of the documents in the recorder’s office would reveal. So long as the 
earlier and separately provided for Declaration or Transfer instrument enunciating the 
promise to pay connected to energy-related activities is properly recorded, any taker of an 
interest in land to which such attaches must be viewed as fastened with notice of that 
promise.48 Further, given that the recorded promise burdening the land of concern is even 
explicitly and conspicuously referenced in the actual deed conveying the subject land, to 
allow that deed’s recipient to escape that promise would have the effect of rendering nu-
gatory all but the most elaborately detailed and specified of burdens expressly listed in the 
operative deed. Not only would this defeat the kind of known payment obligation involved 
in our energy hypothetical, it would also challenge the enforceability of long-enforced and 
fully recognized subdivision restrictions. As noted, these arise from recorded declarations, 
                                                        
 46. This is a highly significant point to make in regard to how both the energy hypothetical, and the subdivi-
sion restriction situations contrast with the facts of Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871). In that case, a deed to 
property was passed to one who later was asserted to be the promisor on an obligation to make partial payments 
on a maintenance commitment associated with the land they had earlier taken. In the context of such a situation, 
it is clear that the land that could serve as the object to which the burden of the promise could attach, was no 
longer in the hands of the earlier conveyor. While with respect to both the energy hypothetical and the situation 
of subdivision restrictions, the land to which the promise could attach was still in the hands of the eventual 
conveyor. As a consequence, when the eventual conveyor in the hypothetical, or the developer in the case of the 
subdivision restrictions, extracts the particular promise from one who will become a purchaser and conveyee, 
there is land in the eventual conveyor’s hands that will pass to the conveyee that is capable of supporting the 
promise the conveyee makes. While it is correct to state that a promise made even after one has taken lands (as 
in Schad) is enforceable, enforcement generally must be sought in contract, and not in property law. A promise 
made relative to the lands that one then holds, but later conveys to another (the energy hypothetical or subdivision 
situation), or a promise made in connection with a conveyance of lands to another, see supra note 36 and cases 
cited therein, can witness enforcement in property law, with all of its attendant consequences under the law of 
real covenants and equitable servitudes.   
 47. Stressing the role of “notice” in the enforcement of restrictions or promises, see Crowell v. Shelton, 948 
P.2d 313, 316 (Okla. 1997) (stating that “one who takes with notice of a restriction affecting it cannot equitably 
refuse to abide by that restriction”).  
 48. The situation in the energy hypothetical would involve one who owns land they are to subsequently con-
vey to another fixing their own land with a recorded burden, and transferring or declaring that the benefit of such 
(i.e., the receipt of money payment) is in the hands of a separate legal entity the owner has created. Timely and 
proper recordation of the instrument of transfer or declaration—which both designates who is entitled to invoke 
the benefit, and establishes the burden that gives rise thereto—provides the basis for either constructive or actual 
notice on the part of all those who, in the future, may take an interest in the burdened lands.  
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created in an instrument entirely separate from the conveyances that fastened particular 
parcels and transferees with the burden of the restrictions. It would also prove antithetical 
to the very notion of promises (i.e., covenants or servitudes) that exhibit the capacity to 
“run with the land.” For to move in the direction of discounting promises that have been 
otherwise properly recorded, just because the deed that is said to pass them to a successor, 
fails to do any more than cross-reference those promises, undercuts all that the notion of 
“runnability” implies. 
VI. IS THE “RUNNABILITY” OF THE BURDEN TO PAY IMPAIRED BY BEING CONTAINED IN 
AN EARLY DOCUMENT THAT BOTH TRANSFERS THE CORRESPONDING BENEFIT OF 
PAYMENT AND GIVES RISE TO THE BURDEN OF HAVING TO MAKE SUCH? 
The preceding section focused on whether a promise to pay money in connection 
with energy-related activities would be unenforceable because contained in an earlier and 
separate instrument than the deed conveying ownership of the subject land to the entrepre-
neur undertaking the payment triggering activities. It cannot be emphasized strongly 
enough that, in the instant section, a related, but entirely distinct question is taken up. The 
focus of the instant section is not the significance of the fact that the promise giving rise 
to the payment burden is contained in an instrument that is earlier and separate from the 
later transferred deed. Instead, its focus is whether the payment burden created in that 
earlier and separate instrument has its runnability impaired by the fact the Declaration or 
Transfer containing it both passes a payment benefit to an entity established by the one 
imposing the promise, and simultaneously creates the burden of payment said to attach to 
certain lands. In other words, the focus in the last section was on the separation of the 
burden’s creation from the conveyance of the land subjected thereto. While the present 
section, on the other hand, is focused on whether there is significance in the fact the burden 
arises simultaneously from an instrument that creates a benefit said to be vested in a des-
ignated entity. 
In this connection, it would serve one well to recall that the two common-place il-
lustrations utilized in the preceding section—the exaction or imposition of a promise not 
to put up a chain-link fence, and that to use only wood shingles when re-roofing one’s 
home—both simultaneously establish a burden of observance on the one taking the subject 
land, and give rise to a corresponding benefit of aesthetic uniformity or stability. Im-
portantly, it is the imposition of a burden on one taking land subject thereto that actually 
gives rise to the corresponding and concomitantly created benefit in favor of another. That 
is to say, when a piece of land is transferred, it is placed under a burden that gives rise to 
benefit for someone else. By way of contrast, our hypothetical energy-related situation 
involves a document—Declaration or Transfer—that is earlier and separate from the deed 
actually conveying the subject land, but with the creation and grant of that document’s 
benefit, it simultaneously affixes the burden that triggers the obligation to pay. Put simply, 
the hypothetical differs in that it is not the transfer of a piece of land with a burden attached 
that gives rise to a benefit, but rather the earlier transfer of a benefit that has given rise to 
the burden that attaches to land that is eventually conveyed to another. In other words, our 
energy hypothetical sequences the burden and benefit the other way around from the more 
common and usual factual situations. 
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Despite any possible suggestions to the contrary, the fact of the energy hypothetical 
sequencing the burden and benefit the other way around has absolutely no deleterious or 
incapacitating effect on the ability of the burden to run to successors-in-interest of the 
original transferee of the land. There are no less than three reasons for that conclusion. 
First, while it is true that such situations are not nearly as common as those where a 
burden is imposed on a transferee of land, with that giving rise to a corresponding and 
concomitant benefit in favor of another, the basic prima facie elements attached to a bur-
den that is capable of running to successors-in-interest to the relevant land do not seem to 
require that there, initially, be a burden imposed, and only subsequent thereto a benefit 
should arise. As noted near the beginning of this essay,49 when the fundamental require-
ments for enforceable real covenants and equitable servitudes were briefly taken-up, the 
keys to a covenant that runs are that the burden touch and concern the land, that it be 
intended to run, that there be notice of the burden on the part of the party sought to be 
obligated, and that there be the requisite “privity.” With the exception of not having to 
show “privity,” the same keys to runnability obtain in regard to servitudes. In the event it 
can be demonstrated that the necessary elements of the prima facie case exists, the burden 
is said to pass to successors-in-interest to the land. Nothing requires that some additional 
requisite of a benefit arising from an initially established burden also be demonstrated. 
There is no directive mandating that a particular ordering in the sequence of the benefit 
and burden somehow be established. It is more than sufficient that there be a burden arising 
from an initially established benefit. 
Second, there is the fact that the law of covenants and servitudes shares much with 
the law of easements, as both are so-called incorporeal hereditaments, non-possessory in-
terests in the lands of another.50 Without getting into great detail about the particulars of 
easements, just like covenants and servitudes, they too can arise by virtue of a grant or 
conveyance from one entity to another.51 Thus, a person vested with title to a particular 
piece of land may convey to a transferee a right to use some specified portion of that land—
for ingress or egress—to access an adjoining property that the new easement holder may 
own. Plainly, in such a case, the transferor or grantor of the easement is creating a benefit 
in favor of the new easement holder. That easement beneficiary is now entitled to exercise 
a non-possessory use right that had not previously existed in the transferee. Through the 
initial grant of that benefit to the easement holder, a corresponding burden arises on behalf 
                                                        
 49. See supra Part II. 
 50. For Oklahoma cases endorsing this position, see O’Neil v. Vose, 145 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1944); Vranesevich 
v. Pearl Craft, 241 P.3d 250, 253 (Ok. Civ. App. 2010); Goss v. Mitchell, 259 P. 3d 886, 891 (Ok. Civ. App. 
2011). On the relationship of covenants and servitudes to easement, compare Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified 
Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982) and Susan F. French, Towards a Modern Law of Servi-
tudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982) with Lawrence Berger, Unification of the 
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339 (1982), and Lawrence Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, 
Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337 (1986). See also WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK 
& DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 470 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that covenants are first cousins to 
easements appurtenant). 
 51. Easements, it will be recalled, can also arise by implication from quasi-easements, and by way of pre-
scription through hostile or adverse activity. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.1-8.108 (A. 
James Casner, ed. 1952); 3 HERBERT TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROP. §§ 756–847 (3d ed. 1939); STOEBUCK 
& WHITMAN, supra note 50, at 435–69.  
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of the owner of the affected land to permit the easement holder to exercise the rights in-
volved. The benefit and the burden of easements by grant are almost always created in 
precisely the way described. Questions never arise about the enforceability of such ease-
ments against successors-in-interest to the burdened (or servient) property, as long as the 
successors have notice of the easement’s existence, and nothing indicates the easement 
itself was to somehow end in the event the servient land were ever transferred to another.52 
In light of the fact that covenants and servitudes are in the nature of easements, the refusal 
to draw into question the enforceability of easements by grant when the burdened land has 
passed into the hands of a successor indicates the exact same kind of approach should be 
taken in connection with covenants and servitudes in which it is the initial granting of a 
benefit that gives rise to a corresponding burden. If it is commonplace for easements, under 
appropriate circumstances, to be enforced against a successor to the servient land, then 
there should be no problem with a successor-in-interest to servient land being subjected to 
a covenant or servitude arising from the Declaration or Transfer of a benefit of the payment 
of money.53 
Third, and finally, the 2002 decision in the case of Beattie v. Grand River Dam Au-
thority (GRDA)54 would seem to provide corroboration of that second point. This suggests 
itself as perhaps the most compelling reason for viewing as irrelevant the fact of the burden 
imposed preceding the concomitant benefit, or the benefit preceding the burden. Beattie 
involved a situation in which the federal government, as owner of certain lands in the 
vicinity of the Grand River in northeastern Oklahoma, granted the GRDA various ease-
ments on those lands, retaining the right as the servient landowner to require relocation of 
the easements, should future conditions necessitate. Thereafter, the government conveyed 
the particular servient lands to Beattie and others, indicating in the quitclaim deeds trans-
ferring ownership that the GRDA held the dominant easement rights, but those rights were 
subject to possible relocation requirements. A series of court cases then raised the question 
of whether Beattie and the other servient landholders could exercise the relocation rights 
the federal government had retained in the original easement grant.55 Beattie proceeded to 
                                                        
 52. On the runnability of the burden of an easement, see, e.g., Corbett v. Ruben, 290 S.E.2d 847, 850 (Va. 
1982) (The document creating the easement was “signed, acknowledged, sealed, and recorded by the grantors. 
Thus, the title Corbett [the servient land owner] acquired was burdened by the easement, an encumbrance he 
accepted with constructive, if not actual, notice.). 
 53. It should also be noted that the energy-related hypothetical is not a situation in which one Declares or 
Transfers a benefit without then having an interest in the land to which the corresponding burden is to attach. 
Just like in the easement recounted in the text above, though the first step is to grant a benefit (rather than subject 
one to a burden that gives rise to a corresponding benefit), that benefit necessarily involves land held by the 
benefit’s declarant or transferor, immediately burdening the land with which the benefit is associated. This  ob-
servation is extremely important, for problems would clearly arise in regard to both the law of easements and 
that of covenants and servitudes in the event one were to attempt to grant an easement, or the benefit accompa-
nying a covenant or servitude, before even having an interest in lands sought to be affected. While easements 
may generally be described as “non-possessory use interests in the lands of another,” the other to which that 
description refers is the entity said to be the interest holder in the land subjected to the easement. Similarly with 
regard to covenants and servitudes. If they be described as “non-possessory interests in the lands of another,” as 
they often are, the other referenced is the holder of the land burdened by the affirmative or negative obligation 
inherent therein. By no stretch of the imagination does either of these quoted descriptions suggest one can create 
an easement or covenant or servitude in lands in which they have no interest—lands of another.   
 54. Beattie v. State ex rel. Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 384 (Okla. 2002).  
 55. Id. at 380–81. 
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court on the technical issue of whether the matter should be de-
termined on a motion for summary judgment.56 
The Beattie case is of most interest here, however, not for its specific holding on the 
matter of summary judgment, but for a couple of other reasons. To begin with, in a con-
curring opinion by Justice Opala,57 it supports the notions discussed above of covenants 
and servitudes being non-possessory interests in the nature of easements. Beyond that, just 
as a factual matter, the dispute in Beattie involves a situation in which the grant of the 
benefit of easements gives rise to a burden on the part the servient owners, across whose 
lands such easements run; while simultaneously, the imposition of a burden incident to the 
federal government’s retention of the right to require the easements’ relocation gives rise 
to a benefit entitling exercise of the insistence of relocation.58 
On the former—how covenants and servitudes share with easements the same basic 
non-possessory interest in the lands of another—Justice Opala diverges from the reasoning 
of the plurality opinion’s reliance on contract law, seeing the facts better analyzed from 
the vantage of the law of real property.59 Taking pains to indicate the interplay and rela-
tionship between easements and covenants and servitudes,60 Opala notes that when the 
benefit of the easements for power transmission lines and other uses were granted by the 
federal government to GRDA, the government took on the position of servient land own-
ers, subject to the easement rights of GRDA as holders of the dominant tenement.61 When 
the servient lands were later sold to Beattie and others, his opinion indicated little hesitancy 
about viewing the burden of the earlier granted easements to GRDA passing along to the 
new transferees.62 Opala also emphasizes that the case at hand concerns whether the ben-
efit arising from the retention of the right to compel easement relocation is preferably an-
alyzed as a matter of the runnability of a benefit under the law of covenants and servi-
tudes.63 Viewed from that perspective, he sees Beattie and the others as being potential 
successors-in-interest to a benefit of a right to insist on easement relocation, and GRDA 
as the party holding the land that is subject to the burden incident to that relocation right.64 
                                                        
 56. See Beattie, 41 P.3d 377. 
 57. Id. at 384–91 (Opala, J., concurring). 
 58. See id. 377. 
 59. Id. at 384. 
 60. Justice Opala, in fact, characterizes easements, at the very beginning of an opinion in which he focuses 
almost exclusively on the attributes of covenants and servitudes, as “nonpossessory right[s] to the use of land in 
possession of another.” Id. at 385. Both easements and covenants and servitudes are incorporeal hereditaments, 
interests in lands that are not possessory, but remain inheritable. But while easements are interests in the “use” 
of lands, covenants and servitudes are interests which, in many cases, though not exclusively, concern how land 
is “not used.” In light of Opala speaking in such language—language often employed by scholars and commen-
tators sensitive to the relationships and similarities of easements and covenants and servitudes—it would not 
seem beyond the realm of reason to conclude he accepts that much is shared between the law of easements and 
that of covenants and servitudes. 
 61. Beattie, 41 P.3d at 385–86. Regarding the easements that had been granted to GRDA, Opala characterizes 
the United States government—and, thus, the plaintiffs who took subsequent conveyances from the govern-
ment—as holders of the servient lands, with GRDA the holder of the dominant tenement. In regard to the benefit 
of the covenant concerning the right to insist on relocation of the easements, this made the government—and 
then the plaintiffs—holders of dominant estate, with the GRDA the holder of the burdened servient estate. 
 62. See id. at 385–87 (Opala references “burdened by the easement”). 
 63. Id. at 390 (referencing “for the benefit of the servient estate”).  
 64. Id. at 384–91 (Opala, J., concurring). 
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The other matter concerns GRDA’s easements arising from the grant of a benefit 
that created a corresponding burden on federal lands later transferred to Beattie and others, 
while at the same time imposing the burden of a covenant or servitude on GRDA, thus 
creating a corresponding benefit favoring the holders of the servient land in the form of a 
right to insist on the easements being relocated.65 Regarding that matter, it is instructive to 
reflect on the facts of the case in light of Opala’s property law analysis.66 Again, in terms 
of the burden of the easements, the burden certainly was capable of running to Beattie and 
the others who succeeded to the federal government’s interest in the servient land.67 Noth-
ing in Opala’s opinion suggests otherwise, even though it is clear the burden arose as a 
result of an earlier grant of the beneficial aspects of the easement.68 Runnability was unaf-
fected, despite the fact the burden arose only subsequent to and because of the preceding 
benefit. However, at the same time the burden of the covenant or servitude concerning the 
right to require relocation of the easements is what gave rise to the benefit which, in the 
instant case, Beattie, and the others were hoping to enforce against GRDA.69 On that score, 
while Opala’s opinion does not explicitly and directly address the matter of the relationship 
between easements and covenants and servitudes,70 when it comes to the runnability of 
benefits and burdens under the law of covenants and servitudes, it would seem permissible 
to draw the inference that the order of sequencing of benefits and burdens would be seen 
by him as something of less than monumental significance.71 Clearly, sequencing did not 
matter to him in connection with the runnability of the burden of the easements transferred 
by the federal government to Beattie and the others, even though the beneficial grant of 
the easements to GRDA occurred, conceptually, prior in time. Since covenants and servi-
tudes share much with easements, why should it matter if, in the context of covenants and 
servitudes, it is an earlier benefit that gives rise to the relevant burden? It matters not, in 
connection with easements. 
Putting this together in relation to our energy-related hypothetical, it would not mat-
ter that the very creation of the money payment burden associated with the use of conveyed 
land for specified energy activities was preceded by, and essentially arose from, the earlier 
Declaration or Transfer of the payment benefit, to an entity established by the benefit’s 
conveyor. The capacity of the payment burden to run to successors-in-interest of the entity 
originally subject to the burden is not compromised as a result of it being the passage of 
the benefit of the payment that has given rise to the burden to make such payment. Nothing 
in the basic rules regarding the runnability of covenants and servitudes would suggest such. 
Indeed, both the principles concerning the other non-possessory interests in the lands of 
another—the easement—and the inferences that can be drawn from the raw facts of the 
Beattie case,72 as viewed through the prism of the concurring opinion of Justice Opala,73 
                                                        
 65. Id. at 377. 
 66. Beattie, 41 P.3d at 377. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 384–91 (Opala, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. at 377. 
 70. But see id. at 57–61 for what he does offer. 
 71. See Beattie, 41 P.3d at 384–91 (Opala, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 377. 
 73. Id. at 384–91 (Opala, J., concurring). 
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suggest the same conclusion. The mere fact that a covenant or servitude exists because of 
the benefit of such being granted, transferred, or declared first, with the burden following 
only as a result of the benefit, in no way impairs the ability of burden to run to successors-
in-interest. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What has been discussed focuses only on several of the more intricate aspects of an 
obligation to pay money taken on by a purchaser of land and triggered by some later en-
ergy-related use being made of that transferred land. As indicated at the outset, this essay 
is not intended to address some of the many other important issues such as the application 
of the rule against perpetuities, or the relationship of what is examined herein to the general 
matter of royalty payments connected to classic mineral interests. Similarly, while it is 
apparent that extensive attention is devoted to a variety of aspects of the law of covenants 
and servitudes, it is imperative to note that, since the essay’s basic thrust has been concen-
trated on what might be described as the “burden” side of promise to pay, nothing has been 
offered on how the interaction between that burden and the corresponding benefit regard-
ing payment can, in the view of some, affect the runnability of the burden to successors-
in-interest of the original promisor. Without prejudging the outcome of an examination of 
that matter, it would serve one well to recall that some cases have suggested that a burden’s 
runnability as a covenant is stopped whenever the benefit it creates is personal, while its 
runnability as a servitude might be permitted.74 
Keeping all of that in mind, by way of wrapping-up this essay, it can be said it is 
more than apparent from the preceding sections that various complex areas of the law of 
real property are implicated by any question about holding a successor-in-interest respon-
sible for performing on a predecessor’s promise to pay money, when land taken by the 
predecessor and subsequently passed to the successor, winds up being used for an identi-
fied energy-related activity. Much of the pertinent law governing this subject has to do 
with the mysteries of the runnability of real covenants and equitable servitudes. Illustrated 
by the foregoing is that circumstances do indeed exist under which such successors can be 
found legally obligated to fulfill money payment obligations of that nature. At present, the 
issue of the runnability of such promises may have the most significance in the context of 
more traditional energy activities like the construction of oil and gas storage facilities. 
Nonetheless, since the reality is that, with ever-increasing demand for energy from alter-
native sources like wind and solar, use of more acreage for the production of energy is 
highly probable. Thus, raising the prospects for transfers of such acreage being accompa-
nied by commitments from transferees to pay money in the event the property changing 
hands is ever used for identified energy-related activities, and thereby obligating succes-
sors-in-interest to fulfill commitments they did not personally make. 
                                                        
 74. See, e.g., Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. 1961); Lincoln v. Burrage, 59 N.E. 
67 (Mass. 1901). Contra Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 440 N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), aff’d, 
457 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1983).  
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